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What	are	the	legal	aspects	of	‘packing’	the	Lords	with
Brexit-friendly	peers?
The	recent	string	of	government	defeats	in	the	House	of	Lords	over	amendments	to	the	European
Union	(Withdrawal)	Bill	has	reignited	the	debate	over	the	role	of	the	Lords	in	a	modern	democracy.
The	Daily	Mail	published	a	characteristically	trenchant	headline	suggesting	that	we	should	“pull	the
plug”	on	the	“traitors	in	ermine”.	With	12	new	peers	just	announced	–	nine	of	whom	are
Conservative	–	Francis	Young	considers	the	legal	aspects	of	‘packing’	the	Lords	with	pro-Brexit
members.
The	abolition	of	the	House	of	Lords	is	still	probably	some	way	off,	but	the	recent	events	have	raised	the	question	of
what	options	a	government	has	to	deal	with	resistance	by	the	Lords	to	its	policies.	The	normal	means	of	addressing
this	problem	(if	one	sees	it	as	a	problem)	is	to	invoke	the	Parliament	Acts,	which	provide	that	the	Commons	can
override	the	Lords	by	passing	the	same	bill	in	two	consecutive	parliamentary	sessions.	But	this	remedy	is	not	readily
available	in	the	context	of	the	EU	(Withdrawal)	Bill,	as	the	current	parliamentary	session	will	not	terminate	until	after
Brexit	day	has	passed.
Packed?	The	Lords	in	session	in	2012.	Photo:	UK	Parliament	via	a	CC-BY-NC	2.0	licence
The	government	has	recently	announced	the	creation	of	nine	new	Conservative	peers	(along	with	one	DUP	and
three	Labour	nominees).		This	may	provide	some	short-term	assistance	to	Theresa	May.		Another,	more	radical
option	that	has	been	canvassed	is	that	of	swamping	the	House	with	several	hundred	new	pro-Brexit	peers.		It	is	by
no	means	impossible	that	such	a	possibility	might	end	up	being	pursued,	by	the	current	administration	or	a	future
one,	if	legislative	deadlock	over	Brexit	persists	and	deepens.		Such	a	course	of	action	might,	alternatively,	be
contemplated	by	a	future	Labour	administration	if,	as	with	Clement	Attlee,	the	Lords	did	not	find	Jeremy	Corbyn’s
programme	congenial.
What	are	the	legal	aspects	of	“packing”	the	Lords	with	friendly	peers?
Historical	background
It	has	been	believed	for	centuries	that	the	Lords	can	be	packed	by	the	executive	in	order	to	overcome	resistance	on
a	policy	issue.	Three	examples	illustrate	this.
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In	1712,	Queen	Anne	created	twelve	new	peers	to	facilitate	the	passage	of	the	Treaty	of	Utrecht,	after	the	Harley
ministry	lost	a	division	on	the	address	of	thanks	over	the	issue.	This	was	unprecedented,	and	it	shocked
contemporary	opinion:	was	the	House	of	Lords	to	be	the	creature	of	the	court?	One	of	the	men	who	was	originally
nominated	for	ennoblement,	Sir	Miles	Wharton,	was	so	scandalised	that	he	refused	to	accept	his	peerage.	Queen
Anne	got	her	treaty	through,	but	bad	memories	of	the	affair	lingered	on.	Just	a	few	years	later,	in	1718–19,	Whig
politicians	led	an	attempt	to	enact	a	bill	which	would	have	placed	severe	restrictions	on	the	Crown’s	ability	to	create
new	peers.
Second,	the	threat	of	packing	was	necessary	for	the	passage	of	the	1832	Reform	Act.	On	the	third	attempt	at
parliamentary	reform,	Lord	Grey’s	cabinet	asked	William	IV	to	create	12	or	more	peers	in	order	to	secure	a	second
reading	for	the	legislation;	and	the	request	was	accepted.	In	fact,	the	Lords	passed	the	bill	on	second	reading,	but
they	subsequently	attempted	to	insert	a	wrecking	amendment	in	committee.	Grey	went	back	to	the	King,	who	was
reluctant	to	co-operate;	haggling	ensued	over	the	number	of	new	peers	that	would	be	needed.	The	Government
resigned,	and	the	King	attempted	to	form	a	new	administration	headed	by	the	Duke	of	Wellington	–	a	move	that
brought	Britain	about	as	close	to	revolution	as	it	has	ever	been.	Only	then	did	the	King	give	way	and	agree	to	create
as	many	peers	as	necessary.
Finally,	there	is	perhaps	the	best	known	example	of	a	packing	threat:	the	one	that	was	deployed	during	the	stand-off
between	the	Lords	and	the	Commons	which	resulted	in	the	passage	of	the	Parliament	Act	1911.	After	the	Liberals
lost	their	Commons	majority	in	the	January	1910	general	election,	the	Prime	Minister,	Herbert	Asquith,	advised	the
King	that	it	might	be	necessary	to	create	500	peers	in	order	to	overcome	the	inbuilt	Unionist	majority	in	the	Lords.
George	V	did	not	refuse	the	request,	but	he	did	insist	on	a	new	election,	which	duly	took	place	in	December	1910.	In
the	event,	of	course,	it	did	not	prove	necessary	to	carry	out	the	threat.
These	examples	establish	two	key	points.	First,	packing	the	House	of	Lords	is	a	real	possibility	for	a	government
whose	programme	is	being	frustrated	by	the	upper	chamber.	Second,	it	is	a	highly	controversial	enterprise.
Parliament	–	and	the	media	and	public	opinion	–	would	apply	some	degree	of	restraint	to	the	executive’s	freedom	of
action	in	this	connection.	Modern	conceptions	of	the	role	of	the	courts	in	a	society	governed	by	the	rule	of	law	would
also	seem	to	open	up	the	possibility	of	a	legal	challenge,	just	as	happened	in	the	Miller	case	in	relation	to	the	use	of
prerogative	powers	to	trigger	Article	50.		The	creation	of	peers	is	a	prerogative	power	which	belongs,	if	not	to	the
same	species,	at	least	to	the	same	genus	as	the	(supposed)	power	at	stake	in	Miller.
Has	the	prerogative	been	abridged?
One	of	the	few	legal	commentators	to	have	spoken	publicly	about	this	issue	to	date	is	George	Peretz	QC.	Peretz
notes	that	the	Parliament	Acts	amount	to	a	statutory	scheme	for	forcing	legislation	onto	the	statute	book	against	the
will	of	the	Lords.	He	suggests	that	this	statutory	scheme	has	abridged	the	royal	prerogative	of	creating	peers	for	that
purpose	(the	principle	that	the	prerogative	can	be	abridged	by	statute	in	this	way	was	affirmed	in	the	leading	case	of
Attorney-General	v	De	Keyser’s	Royal	Hotel	Limited	[1920]	AC	508).	This	argument	is	attractive	and	economical,	as
well	as	being	consistent	with	the	plain	fact	that	the	possibility	of	packing	the	Lords	has	not	seriously	been
contemplated	since	the	passage	of	the	Parliament	Act	1911.
The	weakness	in	the	argument	is	that	it	presupposes	that	the	mass	creation	of	new	peers	would	have	the	sole
purpose	of	facilitating	the	passage	of	the	EU	(Withdrawal)	Bill.	The	government	might	easily	make	the	argument	that
such	a	course	of	action	would	also	have	the	broader	purpose	of	altering	the	long-term	composition	of	the	Lords	–	a
purpose	that	has	no	necessary	connection	with	the	Parliament	Acts	and	therefore	cannot	have	been	displaced	by
them.	The	Lords	consists	predominantly	of	pro-EU	members;	but	most	voters	are	in	favour	of	Brexit	(or	at	least	were
so	in	June	2016).	The	government	might	seek	to	argue	that	it	is	right	in	principle	for	the	composition	of	the	upper
house	to	be	changed	in	order	to	align	it	with	the	“will	of	the	people”.	A	future	Corbyn	administration	might	put	forward
an	equivalent	argument.	It	would	be	a	brave	judge	who	issued	a	quashing	order	under	such	circumstances.
It	is	also	worth	noting	that,	if	the	packing	power	has	indeed	been	displaced	by	statute,	the	Lords	themselves	do	not
seem	to	have	noticed	it.	Only	last	year,	Lord	Strathclyde,	one	of	the	House’s	longest	serving	members,	spoke	with
approval	of	the	power:
It	may	happen	only	rarely,	but	to	remove	the	ability	of	the	Prime	Minister	to	threaten	to	increase	the
number	of	Peers,	could	lead	to	an	even	more	assertive	House	than	we	have	today.
LSE Brexit: What are the legal aspects of ‘packing’ the Lords with Brexit-friendly peers? Page 2 of 4
	
	
Date originally posted: 2018-05-25
Permalink: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/brexit/2018/05/25/what-are-the-legal-aspects-of-packing-the-lords-with-brexit-friendly-peers/
Blog homepage: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/brexit/
Whatever	one	thinks	of	his	lordship’s	views	on	this	point,	it	would	be	surprising	if	he	had	failed	to	realise	that	the
prerogative	no	longer	existed.
Can	uses	of	the	prerogative	be	judicially	reviewed?
In	the	leading	case	on	judicial	review	of	the	royal	prerogative,	Lord	Roskill	said	that	“the	grant	of	honours”	still	stood
beyond	the	intervention	of	the	court	(CCSU	v	Minister	for	the	Civil	Service	[1985]	AC	374,	418).	But	this	is	unlikely	to
present	much	of	an	obstacle	to	a	challenge	to	a	Government	attempt	to	pack	the	Lords.	First,	as	an	obiter	statement
(i.e.	one	not	essential	to	the	court’s	decision),	it	has	at	its	highest	only	persuasive	rather	than	binding	force.	Second,
any	challenge	would	inevitably	reach	the	Supreme	Court,	where	the	persuasive	force	of	the	statement	would	be
limited.
It	seems	unlikely,	moreover,	that	the	Supreme	Court	would	dismiss	such	a	challenge	on	bare	jurisdictional	grounds,
without	enquiring	into	its	merits.	The	judicial	trend	has	been	in	precisely	the	opposite	direction.	Indeed,	Mr	Justice
Maurice	Kay	recognised	as	long	ago	as	2002	that	“the	ambit	of	the	“forbidden	areas”	is	not	immutable	and…	the
areas	identified	by	Lord	Roskill…	have	been	reduced.”	(R	(CND)	v	Prime	Minister	[2002]	EWHC	2777	(Admin),	[50])
Grounds	of	challenge
Assuming	that	a	legal	challenge	to	packing	the	Lords	would	overcome	the	initial	jurisdictional	hurdle,	what
substantive	grounds	could	be	raised	by	the	claimant?
The	existence	of	clear	historical	examples	of	threats	to	pack	the	Lords	in	order	to	overcome	policy	disagreements
would	seem	to	weigh	against	the	possibility	that	such	a	course	of	action	would	be	susceptible	to	challenge	on
traditional	common-law	grounds.	Government	decisions	can	generally	be	challenged	on	the	grounds	that	they	are
irrational,	or	that	the	Government	arrived	at	them	on	the	basis	of	considering	irrelevant	factors.		But	there	can	surely
be	no	irrationality	or	irrelevancy	in	a	decision	to	do	something	which	has	been	threatened,	and	accepted	to	be	lawful,
on	several	well-documented	occasions	in	the	past	(two	of	which	occasions,	let	us	remember,	concerned	important
and	salutary	constitutional	reforms).
Nevertheless,	the	Supreme	Court’s	judgment	in	the	Article	50	litigation	suggests	that	the	common	law	recognises	a
distinct	ground	of	challenge	that	would	be	relevant	here:
81.	 ….It	would	be	inconsistent	with	long-standing	and	fundamental	principle	for	such	a	far-reaching
change	to	the	UK	constitutional	arrangements	to	be	brought	about	by	ministerial	decision	or
ministerial	action	alone….
82.	 ….We	cannot	accept	that	a	major	change	to	UK	constitutional	arrangements	can	be	achieved	by
ministers	alone;	it	must	be	effected	in	the	only	way	that	the	UK	constitution	recognises,	namely	by
Parliamentary	legislation….	(R	(Miller)	v	Secretary	of	State	for	Exiting	the	European	Union	[2017]
UKSC	5)
In	that	case,	the	royal	prerogative	was	pitted	against	an	Act	of	Parliament,	namely	the	European	Communities	Act
1972.	Packing	the	Lords	would	not	give	rise	to	a	direct	clash	with	a	statute	in	the	same	way	(in	the	absence	of	a	very
imaginative	purposive	interpretation	of	the	Life	Peerages	Act	1958).	Some	lawyers	would	doubtless	therefore	argue
that	the	principle	quoted	above	is	confined	to	its	own	context	and	would	have	no	role	to	play	in	a	packing	case	–	and
one	can,	as	always,	argue	about	precisely	how	the	text	of	the	judgment	is	to	be	parsed.	Nevertheless,	it	would	seem
that	the	more	persuasive	reading	is	that	the	court	was	asserting	a	general	principle.		Certainly,	the	alternative
proposition	–	that	the	government	can	change	the	British	constitution	by	executive	fiat	–	is	an	audacious	one,	and
one	that	the	Supreme	Court	is	unlikely	to	be	eager	to	accept.
It	is	strongly	arguable	that	the	act	of	fundamentally	reconstituting	the	membership	of	a	House	of	Parliament	amounts
to	a	“major	change	to	UK	constitutional	arrangements”.	If	such	an	act	cannot	be	brought	about	by	“ministerial
decision	or	ministerial	action”,	it	follows	that	the	Prime	Minister	cannot	lawfully	advise	the	Queen	to	pack	the	House
of	Lords	with	new	peers.	Any	attempt	by	her	to	do	so	could	be	challenged	in	court	and	controlled	by	means	of	the
normal	remedies	of	judicial	review.
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This	post	represents	the	views	of	the	author	and	not	those	of	the	Brexit	blog,	nor	the	LSE.	It	is	an	edited	version	of	a
post	that	first	appeared	at	the	UK	Constitutional	Law	Association	blog.
Dr	Francis	Young	is	a	Fellow	of	the	Royal	Historical	Society,	the	author	of	12	books.
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